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NOTES AND COMMENT

old fence and built a fence along the center line of the alleged alley,
which borders the original eight feet conveyed by the east owners and
being the east half of the alley. The alley has not been used by the
public at large and the use was with the consent of the west owners
originally.
The court spends a goodly portion of the opinion in differentiating
between statutory dedication and common law dedication, and rights
by prescription and common law dedication.
The real distinction between statutory law dedication and common
law dedication is that the former requires that there be a grantee in
esse at the time of the dedication to make an acceptance.
The former operates by grant and the latter by estoppel in pais,
and whereas the former conveys the fee the latter merely conveys an
easement. No writing or conveyance is required in either case and
the statute of. frauds does not apply, but there must be an unequivocal intention to dedicate; yet, long acquiescence in public use, coupled
with acts and declarations by the grantor are sufficient.
The essential difference between common law dedication and a right
acquired by prescription is that the latter is acquired by open and
claimed adverse use for the statutory period whereas the former requires no such statutory period and operates by the very consent of
the owner.
In this case there was no unequivocal intention to dedicate and
the original use being by consent, the presumption is that the continued used was by consent of the owner. There being no adverse use
or dedication, there is no easement acquired by prescription or common law dedication.
BERT BERKWICH

-Master and Servant; Liability of Principal Contractors as "third
parties" under Workman's Compensation Act.
Cermak v. Milwaukee Air Power Pump Co.1 In this case the
plaintiff was employed by the Universal Construction Company who
was a sub-contractor to the defendant Pump Company. During the
course of the plaintiff's employment he was injured. Both companies
were under the Workman's Compensation Act of Wisconsin. The
plaintiff collected compensation from the Universal Construction Company and now brings an action in tort against the defendant for injury
sustained as a result of the said defendant's negligence. The defendant pleaded the act as the exclusive remedy to which a demurrer
was interposed. The lower court sustained the demurrer and the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling.
IThe theory of the Workman's Compensation Act is based on the
idea of quick and sure remuneration to an injured employee. The act
provides for a uniform system of compensation, a speedy payment
and a guaranty of funds. In giving this advantage to the employee
he loses, however, some of his common law rights as against the employer for the remedy against the employer announced in the act
is exclusive.
1211 N.W. 354, -Wis.-
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The act, however, is not designed to deprive an employee of a right
of action which accrues from the negligence of some third party. Section 102.29, sub-section I clearly shows the legislative intent to retain
to an employee his common law action against negligent third parties.
Quoting from Smale v. Wrought Washer Mfg. Co.' at page 334:
The purpose and effect of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to control and
regulate the relations between an employer and his employee. As between them
the remedies there provided are exclusive when both are under the act at the
time of the accident. The law does not attempt in any way to abridge the remedies which an employee of one person may have at lawv against a third person
for a tort which such third person commits against him .....

The question then arises is a principal contractor in such a position
in relation to an employee of a sub-contractor as to render the principal contractor liable to an action at common law for negligence. In
other words-is a principal contractor a third party in relation to an
employee of a sub-contractor within the means of section 102.29?
In-defining an employer Section lO2.O4 (2) we have "Every person, firm, and private corporation (including any public service corporation) who has any person in service under contract of hire express or implied, oral of written, and who at or prior to the time of
the accident to the employee for which compensation, under sections
102.03

to 102.34 inclusive may be claimed, shall . .

become subject to the provisions of Section

.

. have elected to

102.03 to 102.34 inclusive

Section 102.o6 provides that an employer subject to the provisions of
Sections 102.03 to 102.34 inclusive, shall be liable for compensation
to an employee of a contractor or sub-contractor under him who is
not subject to Sections 102.03 to 102.34 inclusive or who has not
complied with the conditions of sub Section 2 of Section 102.28 (relating to insurance to be carried by the sub contractor) in any case
where such employer would have been liable for compensation if such
employee had been working directly for such employer.
In passing upon the question above expounded, the court in the
majority opinion clearly takes the position that the act will not and
does not create a relationship of employer and employee which in fact
does not exist. The provisions of Section l02.O6 which makes the
principal contractor liable for insurance in case the sub-contractor fails
to comply with the act "does not make it an employer under the statute
any more than any insurance carrier is put in the relationship of an
employer of an injured employee by the fact that he has insured the
payment of -compensation."
The decision in this case is of far reaching importance and makes
the position of a principal contractor rather precarious. This case
decides that the principal contractor is liable as a third party in case
his negligence causes injury to an employee of a sub-contractor who
does comply with the act. This makes the principal contractor liable
as any third party. By the terms of the act the principal contractor is
liable for injuries regardless of negligence to an employee of a subcontractor who does not comply with the act. In this situation the
principal contractor is made an insurer by operation of law.
16o Wis. 331.
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It might be well to state in this connection the objection of the dissenting justices to the constitutionality of the interpretation of the
court. "If the principal contractor, who has complied with the law
and requires his sub-contractor to protect his employees by insurance,
is not an employer, within the meaning of the statute, I see no constitutional basis upon which liability may be imposed upon him. It is
said that by accepting the terms of the act he becomes an insurer;
the act makes no provision for third or .other party bringing themselves
within its terms. One not an employer "cannot accept the provisions
of the act." The relationship is certainly not that of insured and
insurer, for that relationship implies the voluntary agreement to assume
by contract a definite obligation."
CHARLES L. GOLDBERG
Monopoly: Fixing of Reasonable Prices; Reasonable Restraint
of Trade.
In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. et al.,1 a prosecution under
the Sherman Anti-Trust law, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier
position that a combination between producers of articles sold in
interstate commerce to fix prices is in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, regardless of whether or not the prices fixed are unreasonable.
In their exposition of the present state of the law an interesting
analysis of the law on this point was drawn by Justice Stone. The pertinent, refused instruction primarily considered in this regard was as
follows :
The essence of the law is injury to the public. It is not every restraint of
competition and not every restraint of trade that works an injury to the public;
it is only an undue and unreasonable restraint of trade that has such an
effect and is deemed to be unlawful.

The charge was found to be true as an abstract proposition although
inapplicable to the present case to the point of effect of reasonableness of prices fixed. The charges given, viewed as a whole, were held
to have fairly submitted to the jury the question whether a price fixing
agreement was entered into by respondents. The gist of the Court's
discussion on this point is embodied in the following at page 406-7:
It does not follow that agreements to fix or maintain prices are reasonable
restraints and therefore permitted by the statute, merely because the prices themselves are reasonable.
Our view of what is reasonable restraint of commerce is controlled by the
recognized purpose of the Sherman Law itself. Whether this type of restraint
is reasonable or not must be judged in part at least in the light of its effect on
competition, for whatever difference of opinion there may be among economists as.
to the social and economic desirability of an unrestrained competitive system, it
cannot be doubted that the Sherman Law and -the judicial decisions interpreting
it are based upon the assumption that the public interest is best protected from
the evils of monopoly and price control by the maintenance of competition..
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably
71 Law Ed. Sup. Court Rep. 404, decided Feb. 21, 1927.

